Diplomacy? :: Twin Peaks Gazette Message Board - Powered by JorkelBB 2006 (beta)

Thought I'd post this apart from Lebanon-Hezbollah material. The Stratfor reports -- "red alerts" -- have been coming fast and furious the past week. This latest one describes some possibilites. But ewwwwwwwwww, Dominic de Villepin! FEH!

I would think this would be the kind of information that may be useful to the anti-war/anti-Israeli/anti-violence folks. It's useful to have this sort of behind-the-scenes explanation of motives.

Red Alert: A Diplomatic Interlude
Stratfor: July 17. 2006
There is increasing discussion of a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon. French Prime Minister Dominic de Villepin is in Beirut to discuss it. The Israelis say they are talking to the Italians about it, and even the Iranians have said that they favor a cease-fire. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said today, "A reasonable and just solution must be found to end this crisis. A cease-fire and then a swap is achievable." That is quite a distance for the Iranians to have gone. (Had the Israelis been 'proportional' as described by the anti-Israeli camp, think Iran would have come to this conclusion one week later?)

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert listed three demands for a cease-fire: first, the release of captured soldiers; second, an end to rocket attacks on Israel; and third, the deployment of Lebanese Army troops along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Other diplomats have been talking about an international force along the border. (This sounds like a good plan, right? Who could object other than Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas?)

The first two demands can easily be met. It is the third one that will be the sticking point because it goes to the heart of the issue. When Israel talks of the Lebanese Army being deployed there, it is saying two things. The first is that it doesn't trust an international force containing troops from countries like Russia and France. It does not believe they will be neutral. Second, if a Lebanese force is deployed, it must be able to impose its will on Hezbollah, through military action if possible.

The problem is that the Lebanese Army is not in a position, politically or militarily, to control Hezbollah. If it could do so, it would have. Moreover, if the army were able to impose its will, Hezbollah would cease to be an effective group. Hezbollah's power comes from its military capabilities and autonomy. Israel's demand would represent the end of Hezbollah in its current form. Israel does not trust a suspension of Hezbollah attacks; they believe the militants will strike again unless someone can guarantee otherwise. Israel's call for a Lebanese force that can impose its will on Hezbollah is a contradiction in terms. It is an offer of a cease-fire that can't be delivered. (But maybe if Israel does a sufficient job of decapitating -- figuratively, of course -- Hezbollah, control via the Lebanese military would be POSSIBLE.)

Israel is, however, interested in continuing the diplomatic process. Its reasoning can be seen from reports Stratfor has received from sources close to Hezbollah. They have said that Hezbollah is maintaining its attacks on Israel because the militants want Israel to attack them on the ground sooner rather than later. Over time, they fear, Hezbollah's ability to resist Israeli attack will be undermined by airstrikes. The militants' command and control, communications, weapons stockpiles and morale will be undermined. On the other hand, if Israel were to attack now, Hezbollah's leadership is confident that it could impose losses on Israeli troops that would be unacceptable. That is what the militants want to achieve -- they want to engage Israel as the first Arab force that, even if it can't win in the end, can severely damage the Israel Defense Forces.

If that is actually Hezbollah's thinking -- and that would explain their behavior -- then we can also better understand Israeli thinking. If the airstrikes are hurting Hezbollah's morale and infrastructure, there is no reason to hurry in on the ground. It makes more sense to let the current situation continue even if it means further attacks on Israeli targets. In the meantime, Tel Aviv can engage in diplomatic initiatives that will reposition Israel in the international system. Rather than resisting diplomatic efforts, Israel is participating, setting demands that appear extremely reasonable while being unattainable. While that game goes on, so does the air war and the undermining of Hezbollah's core strength.

The problem is that Hezbollah can see this happening. That means it must try to increase its attacks to create a political crisis in Israel. Olmert is under a microscope. There is suspicion that he will be sucked into a diplomatic solution that will not only not deal with the Hezbollah threat, but also make it impossible to attack the militants later if they resume attacks. In this scenario, an international presence is forced on Israel, Hezbollah resumes attacks without the international force taking decisive action, and Israel is forced to either do nothing or attack through the international force.

In other words, there is a trap for Israel in all of this. If it gets too clever on the diplomatic side, it can wind up in trouble. On the other hand, a diplomatic process gives Israel time to do what Hezbollah wants least: an air war designed to impose attrition on them.

We have not expected the Israelis to accept bombardment for as long as they have. However, if Hezbollah's view is correct, it is good military strategy and the Israeli public will accept that. It may force Hezbollah to make serious concessions under pressure to preserve the cohesiveness of its force. But if the diplomatic game results in extended attacks on Israel without action, or results in a cease-fire that does not preclude a resumption of attacks, then Olmert will come under dramatic pressure and will lose his room for maneuver.

Olmert knows this, of course. He has managed the internal politics skillfully to this point. He can probably play diplomatic games for another 48 hours by implying military necessity to his Cabinet. But then it starts to become very dicey politically. And by then, Hezbollah's attacks will have become intolerable, and attacking -- whatever the condition of Hezbollah -- will become essential.

Neither an international force nor the Lebanese Army (with its current capabilities) protecting Israel from Hezbollah attacks will fly in Israel.